60 research outputs found
Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution and convex descompositions of TU games
We study under which conditions the core of a game involved in a convex decomposition of another game turns out to be a stable set of the decomposed game. Some applications and numerical examples, including the remarkable Lucas five player game with a unique stable set different from the core, are reckoning and analyzed.convex games, cooperative games, stable sets
A geometric characterization of the nucleolus of the assignment game
Maschler et al. (1979) provide a geometrical characterization for the intersection of the kernel and the core of a coalitional game, showing that those allocations that lie in both sets are always the midpoint of certain bargaining range between each pair of players. In the case of the assignment game, this means that the kernel can be determined as those core allocations where the maximum amount, that can be transferred without getting outside the core, from one agent to his/her optimally matched partner equals the maximum amount that he/she can receive from this partner, also remaining inside the core (Rochford, 1984). We now prove that the nucleolus of the assignment game can be characterized by requiring this bisection property be satisfied not only for optimally matched pairs but also for optimally matched coalitions.assignment game, core, kernel, nucleolus
Max-convex decompositions for cooperative TU games
We show that any cooperative TU game is the maximum of a finite collection of convex games. This max-convex decomposition can be refined by using convex games with nonnegative dividends for all coalitions of at least two players. As a consequence of the above results we show that the class of modular games is a set of generators of the distributive lattice of all cooperative TU games. Finally, we characterize zero-monotonic games using a strong max-convex decomposition.zero-monotonic, convex games, lattice, modular games, games, cooperative tu-game
The Lorenz-maximal core allocations and the kernel in some classes of assignment games
core, assignment game, lorenz domination, kernel
A geometric chracterization of the nucleolus of the assignment game
core, assignment games, nucleolus, cooperative games, kernel
Sequential decisions in allocation problems
In the context of cooperative TU-games, and given an order of players, we consider the problem of distributing the worth of the grand coalition as a sequential decision problem. In each step of the process, upper and lower bounds for the payoff of the players are required related to successive reduced games. Sequentially compatible payoffs are defined as those allocation vectors that meet these recursive bounds. The core of the game is reinterpreted as a set of sequentially compatible payoffs when the Davis-Maschler reduced game is considered (Th.1). Independently of the reduction, the core turns out to be the intersection of the family of the sets of sequentially compatible payoffs corresponding to the different possible orderings (Th.2), so it is in some sense order-independent. Finally, we analyze advantageous properties for the first player.core, reduced game, sequential allocation, tu-game
Non-manipulability by clones in bankruptcy problems
In the domain of bankruptcy problems, we show that non manipulability via merging and splitting claims by identical agents characterizes the proportional rule provided claims are positive rational numbers. By adding either claim monotonicity or claims continuity we obtain new characterizations to the whole class of bankruptcy problem
Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution and convex descompositions of TU games
We study under which conditions the core of a game involved in a convex decomposition of another game turns out to be a stable set of the decomposed game. Some applications and numerical examples, including the remarkable LucasÂż five player game with a unique stable set different from the core, are reckoning and analyzed
Path monotonicity, consistency and axiomatizations of some weighted solutions
On the domain of cooperative games with transferable utility, we introduce path monotonicity, a property closely related to fairness (van den Brink, in Int J Game Theory 30:309-319, 2001). The principle of fairness states that if a game changes by adding another game in which two players are symmetric, then their payoffs change by the same amount. Under efficiency, path monotonicity is a relaxation of fairness that guarantees that when the worth of the grand coalition varies, the players' payoffs change according to some monotone path. In this paper, together with the standard properties of projection consistency (Funaki, in Dual axiomatizations of solutions of cooperative games. Mimeo, New York, 1998) and covariance, we show that path monotonicity characterizes the weighted surplus division solutions. Interestingly, replacing projection consistency by either self consistency (Hart and Mas-Colell, in Econometrica 57:589-614, 1989) or max consistency (Davis and Maschler, in Nav Res Logist Q 12:223-259, 1965) we obtain new axiomatic characterizations of the weighted Shapley values and the prenucleolus, respectively. Finally, by the duality approach we provide a new axiomatization of the weighted egalitarian non-separable contribution solutions using complement consistency (Moulin, in J Econ Theory 36:120-148, 1985
Non-manipulability by clones in bankruptcy problems
We introduce non-manipulability by clones for bankruptcy problems, which entitles claimants to merge or split only when they are or become identical agents. We show that this weaker nonmanipulability requirement, together with either claim monotonicity or claims continuity, allows for new characterizations of the proportional rule on the general class of bankruptcy problem
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